Introduction
The implications of the successive fall of communist regimes in Central and East European Countries (CEECs) have become tremendous for Europe as well as the integration process it has been experiencing. Among others, it gave an unprecedented momentum to European integration towards Eastern and Central Europe. The European Union (EU) created 'powerful tools to shape institutions' and political structures in the CEECs through the mechanisms of conditionality, financial aids and other instruments which were directly associated with accession to the EU. 1 Therefore, the EU found the opportunity to impose its conception of development and modernization through accession; modernization 'legitimated around a collective identity based on liberal norms of capitalist democracy'. 2 After the 1980s' southern European enlargement, the European Union has once more appeared as the external modernizing subject and ideal model to emulate for the countries undergoing post-communist transformation. The political and economic models of its core members 'were seen as normatively superior and readily transferable to displace inferior models in candidate countries'. 3 The last wave of EU enlargement ran in parallel to the rapid increase of a rather post-ontological research agenda and its literature on Europeanization dedicated to understand the domestic impact of the EU in the member and candidate countries. 4 This is comparable with the rise of the 1950s' neo-adaptation, but rather as a normative/political context; a context experienced and mobilized by different social groups in varying degrees and modalities in different historical periods of time. This is not only due to the fact that the European and Western modernity it has symbolized has been extensively mobilized by the modernizing elite to justify their vision of state and society since the nineteenth century; but also different political groups taking part in contemporary debates about the nature of the domestic regime in Turkey have often framed their political arguments by making reference to European norms, policies and expectations. Therefore, different discourses of Europe and Europeanness have been an integral part of modernity and regime debates in Turkey. The current intervention argues that mainly two different rhetorics ('Republicanist' and 'Integrationist') of modernization and Europe have dominated these public debates. The 'Republicanist' rhetoric foregrounds Turkish republican-Kemalist values, i.e., Westernization, relentless secularism and nationalism as the guiding principles of Turkish modernity and its relations with Europe. It employs a more state-centric conception of Europe: Europe as the birthplace of nation state, modernity and Enlightenment. The 'Integrationist' discourse advocating economic and political liberalization, and integration with globalized politics and market, associates Europe with pluralism, individual rights and freedoms, market economy and economic welfare. It does not draw on a notion of modernity which is necessarily linked to Westernization.
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The article first examines and problematizes how change in the domestic through Europeanization is understood in the current new institutionalist literature. Secondly, it unpacks the distinction it has made between EU-ization and Europeanization and relocates the latter within a broader sociological terrain. Then, the article turns to the Turkish case, with the aim of historicizing the experience of Europeanization as a political-normative context. Focusing on the post-1923 period, the study examines changing meanings of Europe-Europeanization for different segments of Turkish society in different historical periods of time. Yet, the emphasis will be placed upon recent regime and identity debates that have been informed by the distinct perceptions and representations of Europe.
Europeanization: change as institutional adaptation
At the most fundamental level Europeanization is a concept presuming a necessary relationship of diffusion between the EU level 'institution building and identity formation' 12 and the domestic change in member and applicant states. It suggests a 'post-ontological' 13 research agenda through which the possible and materialized outcomes of this relationship are analyzed, but the causality behind this relationship is often omitted. To put it differently, the literature is largely inclined to explore the domestic effects of already established EU institutions. The common denominator in most usages of the term is its definition as a 'process of change and adaptation which is understood to be a consequence of the development of the European Union' 14 both at the domestic and European levels. In the literature 'it has become common to use Europe with reference to the European Union and its member states'. 15 The straightforward identification of Europe with the EU makes the EU the Domestic actors are often 'only considered as mediators' of these top-down pressures and no real political role and discretion are recognized to them. 25 Rationalist institutionalism cites the number of domestic actors having veto power and provision of ideational and material support by formal institutions to the pro-European actors as the two factors mediating change through Europeanization.
These mediating factors, for the sociological account, are the capacity of 'norm entrepreneurs' (e.g. epistemic communities, advocacy networks) to promote change and the existence or absence of political culture 'conducive to consensus-building and cost-sharing'. 26 According to the rationalist variance the elimination of mismatch between domestic and European settings is contingent upon the ability of domestic pro-EU actors to use opportunities and constraints emerging from Europeanization at the expense of their rivals. 27 The sociological variant, suspicious of, yet not totally rejecting this crude positivism, conceives change as a product of inter-subjective, interpretative socialization processes. 28 Domestic change occurs when 'European elites and institutions socialize candidate states into changing first their identities and then their preferences and interests' 29 .
To sum up, in both accounts adaptational pressure comes from the EU, it is mediated by some domestic factors and then 'the domestic' changes through Europeanization. 30 In either case, change refers to a linear, empirically observable and testable process, the success of which mainly depends on the adaptational ability and learning capacity of the European societies. It is a teleological process of progress toward 'the more European' and 'the more modern' embodied in the core Western members of the EU. The process of transformation through Europeanization is presumed to be unilinear and evolutionary, and is applicable to and experienced by all societies engaged in Europeanization in similar modalities. For instance, to Grabbe 31 the newcomers 'are already subjected to substantially the same pressures of adaptation to the EU policies as current member states'. She also assumes that the same accession criteria are applied for the current and future applicants and 'the same policy structure and implementation procedures are used' by the EU.
32
National institutions largely imagined as like-units and homogenous entities are thought to be subject to similar laws of change and adaptation under the impact of Europeanization.
Yet, one should note that unlike earlier studies, the recent research takes account of the fact that the domestic impacts of Europeanization are not fixed 33 , pre-given and even predictable. The response of different societies to change imposed by Europeanization differs by virtue of their different internal structures and specificities. 34 All societies exposed to Europeanization experience it differently 'depending on factors such as specific state formation, the patterns of policy making, the political culture, but also the balance of power between state and society on the one hand, and national and sub-national units on the other'. 35 Given the reductionist and essentialist presumptions of scholarly reflection on Europeanization, a consequential need arises to make an analytical distinction between EU-ization and Europeanization.
As Tim Haughton reminded 42 , such a distinction, though underdeveloped, was already drawn by Helen Wallace, where EU-ization denoted change required exclusively by EU membership. On the other hand, Europeanization, rather than being a process, refers to a context or a situation 'where certain effects can be shown to have occurred'. 43 As Buller and Gamble suggest, 44 defining it in this way is important to reveal 'its variable and contingent nature' and not to assign it any irreversibility and inevitability. Europeanization develops as a wider historical context embracing also other institutions of European integration, whose main object of reference is not the EU, but
Europe. As put by Vink, 45 ''European integration' in itself covers a wider range of processes and institutions. Europeanization is more than just EU-ization'. To illustrate, the gradual liberalization of Greece's minority and citizenship policies from the 1990s onward was much more closely connected to the Council of Europe's activism and reports than to the endeavors of the EU. This study argues that the impact of Europeanization in a given society is largely determined by the extent of and the ways in which Europe is used as a political/normative context by domestic actors. imposed from the outside, but also because it interacts with domestic developments on the inside' 52 .
In view of the theoretical arguments advanced so far, the remainder of this study is dedicated to understanding the Turkish experience of Europeanization. 78 To them, a Turkey that reconciles the Eastern and Western elements of its identity can achieve an alternative model of modernization. 79 For Kemalists, modernization understood as Westernization and contemporarization is an aim in itself for which the society should be mobilized by the state and its elite. 80 Yet for the Integrationists, the Islamic and Middle Eastern elements of Turkey's identity are not incompatible with liberal democracy as a defining property of modernization. Conversely, Turkey's ability to fuse its Islamic and modern values relocates it in contemporary global politics as a pivotal state. 81 In the Islamic, liberal discourse, the notion of modernity is disengaged from state-led Westernization and is rather articulated as an adaptation to the 'global rules of the game'.
Turkey: Europeanization as a context for political contestation and modernity

In the early 2000s the issue of Turkey's European integration as well as its meanings and modalities
have turned out to be a primary cleavage in Turkish politics transcending preexisting ones. imagination, Turkey has undoubtedly been a country 'striving to be Western and taking her place in the front ranks of Western civilization'. 83 The EU membership is the culmination of Turkey's historical march toward the contemporary civilization and modernization set off by the Kemalist revolutions in the early Republican era.
Even though this teleological and linear interpretation of history implies inevitability for the future of Turkey, the Republicanists are aware of the fact that Europe is not the same Europe, of which they once wanted to be part. Europe, which is increasingly becoming post-national and post-Western, 84 more heterogeneous and fragmented, vocalizes demands on Turkey that could jeopardize her territorial integrity, indivisibility and secularist characteristics. It is a Europe, demanding Turkey to recognize new claims to identity, most notably Kurdish and Islamic, which were already pushed by Kemalist/Republicanist paradigm to the sphere of the illegitimate, the anachronistic, the subversive and the disintegrative. To them, Islamic groups most notably the AKP were exploiting 'the excuse of EU harmonization to redefine the secularism principle and bolster the domination of a religious way of life over Turkish society'. 85 The Republicanist imagery and rhetoric reflect a defensive notion of modernization invested with enormous skepticism vis-à-vis the calls for change, especially if these are voiced by the members of the Islamic elite or the European political figures. The EU-demanded reforms are all too often interpreted within an inter-state framework and represented at best as 'interference in Turkey's domestic affairs' and at worst as 'attempts to carve out portions of Turkey's territory'. 86 In the extreme version of this discourse, EU/Europe is depicted as an actor in the plans crippling the state authority 87 One can observe that the AKP adopted a blurred rhetoric as regards the future of Turkish-EU relations in its party program for 2011 general elections in Turkey. To the program, The AKP believes that Turkey's relations with the EU and other international institutions 'must be maintained along the lines of the requirements of our economy and our national interests'. 96 The AKP made scarce references to the requirements and standards of the Union and other European bodies to streamline fundamental rights and freedoms, public administration, social policies, economic and financial reform. The party program cited the EU/European standards only when it mentioned the reforms to restructure the National Security Council and harmonize Turkish judicial system on the basis of the Copenhagen Criteria. 97 These two issues have become strategically important regarding the power-domination relations between the AKP cadres and the secular establishment in Turkey.
Instrumentalization of EU-ization/Europeanization in that way and the stress on national interests testify our theoretical affirmation that domestic actors support Europeanization only when they think that this best serves either to the national interest or to their own elective purposes. This holds true for the CHP as well, adopting a new strategy of mobilizing Europe to redefine its deliberative position and to criticize the government's policies. The CHP embraced a more nuanced and softened approach to the EU as the Union hardened its criticism of the new laws and practices restricting the freedom of the press and of expression in Turkey, and particularly, the government's policies to that effect. Hence, one can suggest that there has occurred a shifting of grounds at least between the main elements of the Republicanist and Integrationist camps concerning the usage of Europe in accordance with the domestic power relations.
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